

SECURITY INFORMATION

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16 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
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ATTENTION : [REDACTED]

VIA : C/SE

SUBJECT : Progress of the Ideological Warfare panel.

1. The ideological warfare panel, composed of representatives of State, FSB, Defense and CIA, is operating under an instruction from the Board to examine the possibilities of the technique, define and limit it, and come up with a statement of whether and how the government should or could go about exploiting its possibilities. To date, the panel has listened to a number of individuals in order to inform itself on what is already under way, and has turned to the task of drafting a paper which will attempt to define objectives, limitations, targets, vulnerabilities of opposing doctrines, methods to be employed.

2. As might be expected in treating a subject in which there is but little American experience, some disagreements among the members of the panel have arisen. While none of these should prove beyond resolution, they may affect adversely the support which some members will be willing to give to the final recommendations. One of the State representatives (Mr. Larson of the USSR desk of CIR) and one of the Defense representatives (Mr. Skalnik of G-2) regard doctrinal warfare as a tool to be employed in influencing the mass mind, while the remaining members question its utility for this purpose, feeling that the most that can be expected is that it will prove useful in disturbing the motivation of opposing decision making groups -- the elite, for want of a better word. While there are moments

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during the panel meetings when I feel that I am dancing on the head of a pin, this particular difference in approach actually is operationally of first importance, and I am concerned that the Agency not get itself committed in advance to more program than it can reasonably handle, especially a program that in essence simply calls for an overly adult approach in mass propaganda. The panel has not yet worked itself clear of this issue.

3. A problem that the panel has not yet faced, but will have to come to grips with sooner or later, is the business of exactly how we as a government organize for doctrinal warfare. A great deal of the material to be disseminated can be attributable and overt, and can be handled within State's book and cultural programs, and to some extent in the information programs of the Army and other agencies. A significant fraction, however, should be overt in character but not attributable, and probably ought to be the Agency's responsibility; while some actions should be quite black, and managed solely and exclusively by the clandestine services. All of it, however, should be carefully related to a single scheme, and every action or publication should fit into a preconceived pattern of controlled effort. Random blows, or a general cooperative determination on the part of one and all to strive for the ideological effect in his treatment of the problems of the day, cannot advance matters in this complex and tricky field. Clearly, a central control over the whole is required, but how to create such a central control in terms of the present organization ^{of} of the government for psychological warfare is not clear to me. Should any thoughts on this subject be developed, I would certainly appreciate their being communicated to me.

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Acting Chief

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